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While no member state has ever left the European Union, Greenland opted to leave the EEC in
1985. Ulrik Pram Gad assesses what lessons the case of Greenland might have for the UK
following its decision to leave the EU. He suggests that while the two situations are radically
different, Greenland could serve as inspiration for a model in which Scotland, Northern Ireland and
Gibraltar could retain membership of the EU while England and Wales pursue their own
arrangements.
Greenland is often mentioned as one of the few territories to have previously left the EU (or the EEC
as it was when Greenland left in 1985). Greenland’s exit is, however, generally a poor precedent for Brexit. Both in
terms of process, substance, and the size of the problem. Nevertheless, there might be lessons to learn concerning
the importance of constitutional pragmatism and willingness on all sides to play games with sovereignty.
Nuussuaq district in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, with the Sermitsiaq mountain in
background. Credits: Oliver Schauf.
In one specific way, the case of Greenland is indeed a precedent for the UK. Scotland is not the first place in which
the question of EU membership has worked as a catalyst for devolution and constitutional reform. In 1972, a huge
majority in Greenland voted against membership, but constitutionally integrated, the island had to follow Denmark
into the EEC. This experience boosted the demands for home rule in Greenland – particularly as the Faroe Islands
were allowed to stay out of the EEC, due to their 1946 home rule arrangement. Implemented from 1979, the
Greenlandic home rule arrangement made withdrawal from the EEC possible in 1985.
But there is a more important way in which the Kingdom of Denmark may serve as an instructive example for the
United Kingdom. The Danish case highlights how one sovereign state may comprise territories with a variety of
formal and practical statuses via-à-vis the EU. Actually, the UK in itself involves some of the same diversity. But the
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extremes and dynamics represented by Greenland and the Faroe Islands under Danish sovereignty might make
new opportunities visible, that have not appeared from the British Commonwealth.
How Greenland left the EEC
When Greenland left the EEC, there was no Article 50 in the European treaties. Nor would such an article have been
relevant, since what was taking place was not the exit of a member state. Rather what happened was that parts of
the territory of a member state were exempted from membership. This was not a unilateral decision; it was
formalised in a protocol to the treaties, known as ‘The Greenland Treaty’, signed by all member states.
Denmark remained a member state, Greenland was transferred to a category of ‘Overseas Countries and Territories
with constitutional links to a member state’. This category already existed in the treaties, laying out a framework for
such territories’ association with the EEC. As part of the negotiations, Greenland had to agree to special conditions
(a fisheries agreement, selling stocks for cash) to receive the preferential OCT status.
Initially, negotiations between the EEC and Greenland were handled by Denmark, with mandates cleared with
Greenlandic authorities in Nuuk. But increasingly over the years, both the substantial preparations of negotiations
and the communication has been taken over by Nuuk. This forms part of a general tendency of devolution within the
Kingdom of Denmark. Notably, devolution also involves elements of foreign relations formally core to state
sovereignty.
When the Arctic Council was formed in 1996, the Greenlandic Home Rule prime minister signed the founding
documents on behalf of Denmark. No-one doubted his credentials. In 2005, Denmark circulated a diplomatic note to
inform foreign diplomats that Greenland and the Faroe Islands could sign bilateral agreements with foreign states
(provided that they only involved devolved matters). And if we look beyond Denmark, it is not uncommon for states
to mandate lawyers, private citizens, NGO representatives – sometimes foreign nationals – to represent them at
meetings in international organisations. This was essentially how the history of diplomatic practice began.
What matters is that all parties acknowledge the credentials of the representative. In 2013, the Danish authorities
even agreed to launch an appeal at the WTO Board of Disputes on behalf of the Faroe Islands against the EU over a
fisheries dispute – a matter which the Kingdom of Denmark has left to Brussels (Danish fisheries) and Tórshavn
(Faroese fisheries). In this truly unprecedented situation, Denmark was preparing to launch a case against itself,
though the matters were eventually settled ‘out of court’ before the case was launched.
A Greenland style ‘territorial exemption’ for England and Wales
The Brexit referendum results in England and Wales contrasted sharply with those in Scotland, Northern Ireland,
and Gibraltar. Taking these differences into account – and combining them with prospects of Scottish independence,
renewed troubles in Northern Ireland, and potentially severe isolation in Gibraltar – the UK could refrain from
activating Article 50. Instead, negotiations could aim at a territorial exemption of England and Wales from UK
membership.
The UK would still be a member state – voting rights reasonably reduced to match the population of Scotland and
Northern Ireland. The question of who would represent this member state, on what mandate, and following what
procedures of coordination would have to be solved within the UK. Possibly, the role of Scottish ministers and
bureaucrats from Northern Ireland would have to be central.
The ‘reverse Greenland’ arrangement sketched above might solve the issue for Scotland, Northern Ireland and
Gibraltar, but it would, of course, leave another problem on the table: namely the relationship England and Wales
would have with the EU and the single market. Inspiration for this relationship would have to be found elsewhere as
there is little guidance that can be offered by the Greenland case.
But while the EU might appear to be a rigid legal community, the political processes that generate EU agreements
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are based chiefly on pragmatism. There is therefore scope to create unique arrangements and the formalities of the
process will hardly act as an obstacle in achieving this. Greenland’s experience illustrates that it can be necessary to
play games with a state’s formal sovereignty in order to uphold it. Copenhagen seems to have learned that lesson –
now the question is whether London will too.
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